At 10:00 a.m. on June 22, 2026, Professor Zeng Yan from the Research Center for Financial Engineering and Risk Management at Sun Yat-sen University was invited to deliver an online academic presentation titled "Optimal Cooperative Investment Strategies between Government-Guided Funds and Venture Capital Institutions" via Tencent Meeting. Relevant faculty members, as well as master's and doctoral students, from the School of Mathematical Sciences at Nanjing Normal University attended the presentation.This report centers on the collaboration between government-guided funds and venture capital (VC) institutions to support science and technology innovation projects. Professor Zeng Yan beganby outlining the research background, noting that government-guided funds serve as a critical policyinstrument for leveraging fiscal capital to attract private investment, bolster technological innovation, and cultivate new quality productive forces. While these funds play a significant role in promoting entrepreneurship and industrial upgrading, several practical challenges persist, including insufficient post-investment management incentives for VC institutions, declining innovationmotivation among start-ups, and suboptimal efficiency in the utilization of public funds. To addressthese issues, the report integrates government-guided funds, VC institutions and innovation actors into a unified analytical framework and develops a three-party sequential game model. This model characterizes the decision-making process across three stages: the government-guided fund determines its capital contribution ratio, the VC institution chooses its level of effort in post-investment management, and the innovation entity selects its own innovation effort level. Thefindings indicate that the capital contribution ratio of a government-guided fund is not necessarily the higher the better; rather, an appropriate range exists. Setting the ratio too low fails to attract VC participation, while setting it too high diminishes the fund's expected payoff and consequentlyreduces the cost-effectiveness of government capital. In terms of policy implications, ProfessorZeng recommends that government-guided funds carefully calibrate their contribution ratios, establish a moderate yet dynamically optimizable performance-based reward mechanism, and further refine fault-tolerance arrangements and performance evaluation systems.After the report, participating faculty members and students engaged in discussions on topics including the incentive mechanisms of government-guided funds, the specification of the three-party sequential game model, the effects of parameter changes on equilibrium outcomes and the related policy implications. Professor Zeng provided detailed responses to these questions and drawing on typical real-world practices of cooperation between government-guided funds and venture capital institutions, further discussed possible directions for extending the research.（By Zhibin Liang）